DoomsdaysCW<p>After <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/Fukushima" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>Fukushima</span></a>: A Survey of <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/Corruption" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>Corruption</span></a> in the Global <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/NuclearPower" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>NuclearPower</span></a> Industry</p><p>Richard Tanter<br />Asian Perspective<br />Vol. 37, No. 4, Special Issue: After Fukushima: The Right to Know (Oct.-Dec. 2013)</p><p>Abstract:</p><p>"Investigations of the <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/FukushimaNuclearPowerAccident" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>FukushimaNuclearPowerAccident</span></a> sequence revealed the man-made character of the catastrophe and its roots in regulatory capture effected by a network of corruption, <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/collusion" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>collusion</span></a>, and <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/nepotism" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>nepotism</span></a>. A review of corruption incidents in the global nuclear industry during 2012-2013 reveals that the Japanese experience is not isolated. Gross corruption is evident in <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/nuclear" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>nuclear</span></a> technology exporting countries such as <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/Russia" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>Russia</span></a>, <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/China" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>China</span></a>, and the <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/UnitedStates" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>UnitedStates</span></a>, and in a number of nuclear technology importing countries. The survey results make clear that national nuclear regulatory regimes are inadequate and that the global regime is virtually completely ineffective. Widespread corruption of the nuclear industry has profound social and political consequences resulting from the corrosion of public trust in companies, governments, and energy systems themselves."</p><p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704842" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="">jstor.org/stable/42704842</span><span class="invisible"></span></a></p><p><a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/IAEALies" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>IAEALies</span></a> <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/TEPCOLies" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>TEPCOLies</span></a> <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/Bioaccumulation" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>Bioaccumulation</span></a> <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/WaterIsLife" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>WaterIsLife</span></a> <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/NoDumping" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>NoDumping</span></a><br /><a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/RethinkNotRestart" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>RethinkNotRestart</span></a> <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/NoNukes" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>NoNukes</span></a> <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/NuclearPowerCorruptionAndLies" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>NuclearPowerCorruptionAndLies</span></a> <a href="https://kolektiva.social/tags/FukushimaIsntOver" class="mention hashtag" rel="tag">#<span>FukushimaIsntOver</span></a></p>